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BOOK REVIEW 
Linguist ic  Analysis and Programming for Mechanical  Translat ion 
(Mechanical Translat ion and Thought).  Edited by SILVlO C~eCATO. English 
text, most of it translated from Italian. Feltrinelli Editore, Milan, 1961. Distri- 
buted by Gordon and Breach, New York. 246 pp. $7.50. 
This work oll machine translation (MT) of language begins by rejecting meth- 
ods based on formal similarities between languages, or on passing from one lan- 
guage to another by means of a third or intermediate language, including those of 
logic or mathematics. The authors, members of the Center for Cybernetic and 
Linguistic Research at the University of Milan (under contract o the U. S. Air 
Force) approach MT via ideas of a philosophical movement begun by M. Schliek 
in Vienna in 1924 ("Vienna Circle"), and known abroad as logical positivism or 
as scientific operationism. In order to understand the book it is necessary to 
understand operationism. We begin this review, therefore, by sketching opera- 
tionism in terms of a parallel movement better known in this country. 
In 1927 P. W. Bridgman attempted to clarify the concepts of physics3 Trying 
to define these in terms of the older "cognitive" approach, namely, by describing 
their "properties," he was struck by the fact that many concepts uch as Newton's 
idea of absolute time (as contrasted with Einstein's relative time) embody proper- 
ties observable by no physical operation which could be performed. IIe therefore 
revised his approach from definition of a concep~ in terms of its properties to 
definition in terms of actual, performable, physical and mental operations. "The 
concept is synonymous with the set of operations" if it is to be "operationally 
meaningful." 
Cecoa~o and co-workers assumed as premise that the process of thinking also 
is definable in terms of operations. Communication of thought is a more complex 
process, involving symbols such as those of language, for interpersonal trans- 
mission of meaning. But again, it should be possible to analyze the operations 
involved. According to Bridgman, an operationally defined concept has a unique 
set of defining operations. These may be quite complex but can be analyzed into 
simpler operations, and these in turn into still simpler ones, until they are further 
unanalyzable. Such operations, usually automatic and intuitive, are the "ele- 
ments" of the operationally defined concept. Ceccato and group sought for and 
assumed they had found a set of elemental or at least further unanalyzable opera- 
tions performed by the mind in communication a d thought. These are: "differ- 
entiation" (operation of discriminating the difference between two things, perhaps 
of arranging them in "polar" form, as darkness and light, attention and disatten- 
1 BRIDGM&N, P. W. (1932), "The Logic of Modern Physics." l~facmfllan, London 
and New York. 
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tion, consciousness and unconsciousness) ; "figuration" (operation of shift ing the 
at tent ion spatially, and of construct ing from the results l inear and spatial  figures) ;
"categor izat ion" (operation of sifting out the similarities in different moments 
of experience). The authors do not state in the book, although they may have done 
so elsewhere, how these essential ly psychological operations are observed, or 
how they decided they are further unanalyzable. However, the above operations 
are assumed only prel iminary to thinking, not the whole process. Thinking is 
assumedto consist in correlating the mental  objects result ingfromperforming the
three elemental operations. At least three separate t ime intervals are involved. 
In the first interval  some mental  object (idea, concept, mental  image, construct) 
eaters the center of awareness.To communicate this object, it must be represented 
by a word or other symbol. In the second and th i rd intervals appear a second 
mental object (and symbol) and a third, which acts as correlator of the other two. 
The roles and order of appearance of the three "corre lata"  (first and second 
correlandum and correlator) depend on meaning, and on syntax of the part ic-  
ular language used. The authors then proceeded to analyze very minutely 
the meanings of the symbols and their  syntactic relations, in the source language 
(usually Ital ian, or English). They did the same for the target language (usually 
Russian, but also French, and Chinese). 
This analysis provides the framework of the method of at tack in programming 
for NIT. The authors assume that  in the act of correlating the successive symbols 
as they occur in a t ime sequence in discourse, the first correlandum is "given 
up"  (in awareness) after the second time interval,  the second correlandum and 
correlator are retained in awareness in the last two intervals. They assume that  
accurate transfer of meaning requires recognition of five out of six things which 
completely determine the correlation: the ident i ty of the three correlata and the 
positions of any two of them (the th i rd then being fixed). To represent the situ- 
ation graphically, they draw a rectangle with long side horizontal.  A line parallel 
to the long side divides the rectangle into halves; and a vertical line divides the 
lower half into quarters. If the first correlandum is known, a dot is placed in the 
left -hand lower cell. If the second is known, a dot is placed in the r ight-hand lower 
cell. If the correlator is known, a dot is placed in the top cell. Only if all three 
cells are occupied is the correlation completely fixed and the rectangle "satu- 
rated."  Since, however, the positions of the correlata re fixed in the cells, while 
their  order of occurrence in discourse is not, the dots are replaced in practice 
with numbers assigned successively to the words in the str ing to be anMyzed. 
Extensions of the basic rectangle occur by using two or more correlated words 
or symbols as one of the correlata. The new rectangle containing correlations as 
correlata becomes a "web"  of correlations. Webs of order 1 or Wl are the actual 
words and signs of the language, and a set of them is the permanent ly-stored 
vocabulary. Webs of order 2 or higher are the transient correlational net which 
arises in analysis for translat ion,  and are usually constructed out of phrases and 
clauses of a sentence. 
Since the basic method of at tack was to analyze sentences of the source lan- 
guage into nested webs of order 2 and up, the next step taken by the group was to 
analyze in great detail, over a period of years, the vocabulary of W~ correlanda 
(mainly nouns and adjectives) and of correlators (mainly verbs, preposit ions and 
BOOK REW]~W 165 
conjunctions).  Large many-row and many-column "matr ices"  were used. The 
analyses centered on including as many as possible shades of me,~ning of each 
word; on determining all possible rules as to how the eorrelata enter into webs 
in the source language; and on how the target language translat ion is synthesized 
from the webs. They distinguished perhaps 100 different parts of speech, and 
nearly 200 "semant ic"  classifications. While these classifications do not present 
a very t idy system, but are somewhat disorderly and "ad hoc," they are impres- 
sively massive and numerous. They provide a detailed t reatment  of the necessarily 
l imited vocabulary. 
At some point in this process the Ceccato group seems to have become a l itt le 
confused as to what they were achieving. It  will be reeMled that  they felt they 
had represented the operations of communicating thought  by analysis of three 
consecutive time intervals. They felt that  because they analyzed the symbols in 
a str ing as they occur in discourse, and coded them into a t ight web with meanings 
carefully distinguished and comparatively exact syntact ic  relations used, that  
they had thereby gained control over the meanings, and were now able to predict 
" thought"  itself. That  is, they seem to assume that  their  semantic and syntactic 
analysis has gone beyond analysis of symbols, and reflects the nature of thought.  
This is also suggested by the subtit le of the book. 
I t  is necessary to make a sharp distinction between the analysis of thought,  
and the analysis of word symbols. Some of this has been at tempted elsewhere by 
the reviewer. ~The situation is somewhat as follows. I t  is not possible to communi- 
cate our direct sense impressions (DSI's). What we communicate are something 
manufactured by the mind, "abstract ions"  from sets of D SI's. Even these abstrac- 
tions are not actual ly comnmnicated, in the sense that  they pass out of one mind 
and into another. What we actual ly do is associate some physical mark or sign 
with a given abstraction. When we make this sign and let it st imulate the appro- 
pr iate sense organ of another person, he recognizes the sign (i.e., symbol) because 
he too has formed the abstraction, and he too has associated the same symbol 
with it. Thus a spoken language is a set of part icular sonic symbols, a written 
language--a part icular set of graphic symbols, mutual ly associated with a common 
set of abstract ions, i.e., understood by a social or ethnic group. Now different 
groups live in different parts of the planet, and the objects and artifacts of which 
they form sets of DSI 's  differ. Hence their  group-shared abstract ions differ. There- 
fore the symbols used for these abstract ions trigger sl ightly or widely different 
sets of abstractions, from one language to another, the more perceptibly different 
the more widely the environments differ. 
No two languages associate the same set of abstract ions (meanings) with word 
symbols, even if the same symbols are used. Therefore no matter  how thorough or 
detailed an analysis of meanings and syntax in one language, it will not be general 
and apply to all others. Thus such an analysis cannot be said to have penetrated 
2 I-IEILPRIN, L. B. (1962), Informat ion storage and retrieval as a switching 
system. Syrup. Appl. Switching Theory in Space Teeh,nology, 27 February-1 
March 1962. Sponsored by the Air Force Systems Command, The Air Force Office 
of Scientific Research, and The Lockheed Missiles and Space Company, Sunnyvale, 
California. Stanford Univ. Press, in press. 
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to the general nature of concepts. There are, of course, an infinite set of symbols 
which can be assigned to any given abstraction. Within the language these might 
form "equivalence classes." But between languages they cannot in principle 
form equivalences of the same order. As a consequence, in order to express in a 
second language the logical equivalent of a statement in the first language (i.e., 
the same class in extension), since the classes represented by word-symbols are not 
partitioned in the same manner in both languages, it follows that the rules of 
combination of the classes, or the syntax, must differ in the two languages. Hence 
a study of word meanings and syntax alone can never give us the " invar iant"  
abstraction, or thought behind the symbol (the same class) such that it is indepen- 
dent of particular language. 
The misconception as to what their analyses had achieved may have been 
strengthened by the fact that the Milan group found that source language text, 
once analyzed, could be translated into a number of target languages having 
widely different structures. For example, it is reported that a small amount of 
text in English or Italian, used as input language, produced acceptable transla- 
tions into French, Russian and Chinese, simply by suitable change of the output 
matrix.~ This apparent independence of output language does not indicate that 
the input language has been transformed into some form independent of com~ 
munication symbols, i.e., thought itself. I t  might be considered that the input 
language has been transformed into an intermediate Ianguage understood by the 
machine. Thus the method of translation finally evolved by the Milan group 
appears formally similar to a method it rejected--passing from one language to 
another by means of a third or intermediate language. 
If this analysis is correct he failure to "get behind" the symbols is no accident. 
On the contrary, it leads us back to a profound truth or principle which limits 
all translation, all communication. The essential operation in translation is to 
grasp the meaning (or intention) lying behind the source language text, and to 
convey it by means of the target language. We may regard this operation as 
prediction, since a good translation has higher probability, not of being "correct,"  
for we cannot in principle know exactly what was intended, but of appearing inter- 
nally and externally consistent o an objective group of experts familiar with 
both languages. More generally, we can regard translation as a "partly-defined" 
symbol transformation. That is, we may regard translation as a transformation 
from one set of symbols to another set, with the systematic part of the transformation 
not operationally definable. No physical or mental operation exists which permits 
direct, objective observation of meaning. It  is observed indirectly. We recognize 
meaning when we experience it subjectively, and respond "meaningful ly." There 
is no public way for others to observe our perception of meaning except by ob- 
serving our behavior. But observing behavior is operationally the same as using 
a set of symbols. Thus there is no way to elude the use of symbols in communi- 
cating meaning, i.e., in communication. There is no way to grasp the substance 
of meaning itself, as Ceccato and group seem to feel when they say they have 
Private communication from Mr. George Shiner, project officer for the Milan 
translation proiect, Rome Air Development Center, Griffis Air Force Base, Rome, 
New York (September 10, 1962). 
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t ransformed the input message into the form of thought. To  do this they wou ld  
have to have achieved independence of symbols,  or at the very least, they wou ld  
have to have achieved some universally-used set of symbols.  Since neither is 
demonstrable,  we  must  conclude that there is no operational way  to observe 
thought  in others without  its transformation into symbols.  This principle of sym-  
bolic communicat ion  arises naturally out of the fact that all information reaching 
the human brain passes through sense organs (see footnote 2). 
Consider ing that the reviewer has tried to strip the book  of pretensions beyond 
the linguistic, and  especially of direct, semantic  insight into thought, what  
remains? Apparent ly  a very solid contribution. The  M i lan  group have created 
bases of classification wh ich  they utilize in flow charting, methods  of iteration, 
and general p rogramming designed to determine possible mean ings  within a nar- 
row range. Great  attention to semantic  shades of meaning,  and  to syntactic rela- 
tions, have led to a limited but highly-organized vocabulary  or dictionary, and to 
a most  compl icated structure of computer  programs.  A very large memory  is indi- 
cated, and a great many  comput ing  steps. Whether  present day  equ ipment  is 
capable of handl ing so huge a load is another matter. 
This brings us to the present. The  M i lan  project has progressed beyond the work  
reported in the book, wh ich  ends in 1960. A second vo lume covering 1961-2 is soon 
to be publ ished in M i lan  (see footnote 3). (It is hoped that the publishers do a 
better Italian-to-English translation than in the first book. Ironically, their 
description of a good mach ine  translation is given in a poor manua l  translation !) 
Ceecatto's method  is regarded by  its sponsors as highly promising. They  expect 
to try it soon with IBM equ ipment  using the largest available memor ies .  To  under- 
stand the second and  future reports, as well as the general approach, this first 
vo lume will be required reading. 
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